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Any attempt to explore the relationship between representations of Muslims and public advocacy 
in modern Western societies must at some point situate both processes in relation to the broader 
crises of liberal citizenship currently afflicting Western democracies. Calls heard in the 1990s for 
multicultural citizenship and pluralist “recognition” have long since given way to demands for 
the exclusion of new immigrants and the coercive assimilation of those – especially Muslims -- 
long since arrived.  This essay examines French Catholic and Muslim perspectives on secularism 
and citizenship in contemporary France.  It highlights disagreements among progressive 
secularists as well as mainline Catholics and Muslims over how to engage the secular state as 
well as one’s fellow citizens.  It explores the ways in which Catholic advocacy for and with 
Muslim citizens has been challenged by conservative trends in French Catholicism, as well as the 
perceived rise of Salafism and, most important, growing support for far-right and Islamophobic 
movements.  The example shows that real-and-existing public spheres look less like the genteelly 
deliberative public spaces Jurgen Habermas described a generation ago.  They are landscapes 
reshaped by movements, social media, and political entrepreneurs making use of reductionist 
arguments and media caricature (“fake news”)  as much as or even more than deliberative 
reasoning.  These realities present serious challenges to those who hope to use education and 
dialogue in public advocacy with and for Muslim citizens. 
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Muslims, Catholics, and the Secular State:  
Inter-Faith Advocacy and Alt-Right Populism in Contemporary France 
 
 Any attempt to explore the relationship between representations of Muslims and public 
advocacy in modern Western societies must at some point situate both processes in relation to 
the crises of liberal citizenship currently afflicting Western democracies. In much of the West, 
the confluence of mass immigration, ISIS/Daesh terrorism, and, most decisively, the rise of alt-
right populisms has shaken public confidence in once widely held liberal assumptions as to 
civility and citizenship in social difference. Calls heard in the 1990s for multicultural citizenship 
and pluralist “recognition” have long since given way to demands for the exclusion of new 
immigrants and the coercive assimilation of those – especially Muslims -- long arrived.1 These 
and other developments have raised deep questions about the received values and practices of 
pluralist co-existence in Western societies.  No community has felt the weight of the crisis more 
forcefully than Muslim citizens.  
 It was against this backdrop that the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs 
(CURA) at Boston University undertook 16 months of field research on the new plurality and 
civic pluralist co-existence in metropolitan Paris, Amsterdam, Montreal, and Los Angeles.  
These four cities were selected for two reasons.  The first is that the nations of which they are 
part are heirs to quite different regimes of secular-liberal governance, vividly demonstrating that 
the “liberal” West is heir to, not one, but, as Alfred Stepan  put it several years back, “multiple 
secularisms.”  The variation across cities also reminds us that, to borrow a Stepan phrase once 
again, patterns of state-religion-society relations in these settings “are best seen as conjunctural, 
socially constructed, political arrangements, rather than as fixed normative models.”2  The 
second reason for choosing these cities is that the main religious traditions to which each of the 
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surrounding societies is heir are today undergoing unprecedented changes, as a result of (with the 
notable exception of the United States) a general decline in formal affiliation among mainline 
Christians, and a pluralization of authority in all faith-traditions.  
 Among these four countries, and in the West generally, few countries have a species of 
state secularism more pronounced and, as far as religious believers are concerned, restrictive, 
than France, the focus of my discussion in the present essay.  Carol Ferrara of Boston University 
was the field researcher for the Paris and Lyon wing of the project I directed, and, as with the 
other country projects, I followed her research with visits, interviews, and my own short-term 
ethnography.   
 
FRENCH MUSLIMS AND THE EMANCIPATORY TELOS 
 My own engagement with Muslim advocacy and representations in the French wing of 
the project has a longer and more personal background.  A generation back, as a young 
undergraduate and activist in France in 1972-1973, I had come to collaborate with a small 
community of progressive Muslim activists in Aix-Marseilles; together we were involved in 
various advocacy causes related to Vietnam, Palestine, and civil rights for French Muslims.  It is 
an understatement to say that my experience wasn’t ethnographic or research driven.  My 
“sample” was self-selected and my own engagement too perspectival and politically motivated to 
be empirically rigorous.  But one fact with regards to Muslims in France in those years resonates 
with something that more recent historical scholarship like that of Jonathan Laurence3 on 
Muslims in France has confirmed: namely, that the primary non-Muslim groupings campaigning 
in support of Muslim civil and economic rights in this earlier period were the communist- and 
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socialist-linked trade unions, complemented by a lesser but vocal array of gauchiste 
organizations (including the ones in which I was active).   
 With regard to the situation and rights of French Muslims, the key narrative promoted by  
my own and other left-leaning groups in those years centered on the claim that the denial of 
Muslim civil rights was the result of inherent injustices in the capitalist system.  We were 
convinced that these had ultimately to do with the efforts of the owners of capital to divide and 
conquer a dominated but resistant working class so as to defend bourgeois interests, not least by 
maintaining a reserve pool of proletarian labor in a legally vulnerable position.  Neither French 
secularism nor its associated models of French nationhood and citizenship figured in our 
representations of and advocacy for Muslim rights.  Even less salient was any recognition that 
Muslim identity as Muslims might at any point figure in the community’s marginalization.  
Muslim identity was instead represented as situated squarely in the ranks of an oppressed 
proletariat and freighted with a simple but emancipatory teleology that aimed to unite all 
progressive classes on the condition of the erasure of religious and ethnic difference. 
 Old social democratic and leftist narratives of this sort are familiar enough, and so remote 
from the gritty Islamophobia of contemporary France as to appear delusionally romantic.  
However, jumping ahead four decades to the mid-2010s, the comparison nonetheless 
underscores just how much the contestations in play with regards to representations of and 
advocacy for Muslims in France have changed.  
 Over the past twenty years the French left’s representations of Islam have become both 
more narratively nuanced and internally agonistic.4  No less significant, the contours of the 
debate have been shaped by a small social research industry that has taken hold in France on the 
identities and social circumstances of Muslim citizens. As the numbers and political importance 
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of French Muslims have grown the challenge of how to represent and advocate for Muslims in 
France has become only greater.  A deep division has emerged among left-leaning intellectuals, 
including those of Muslim background, over how best to promote recognition and representation 
of Muslims in French society.  Although few subscribe to the religion-erasing teleologies of the 
1970s, some intellectuals and activists insist that the grounds for such initiatives must still 
primarily be those of a civic republicanism that backgrounds and privatizes religious confession 
so as to foreground a shared identity as French citizens. A minority, however, insists that 
religion’s privatization is a bridge too far, because it makes erasure of a key part of some Muslim 
French identities a precondition for citizen recognition.5 
 The debate among ostensible social progressives and other public advocates has been 
compounded by developments in the religious field since the late 1990s and early 2000s.  In the 
Muslim community, first of all, the majority of French Muslims until the 1990s seemed either 
religiously casual, or, if observant, committed to a profession of Islam premised on adherence to 
a madhhab with its associated fiqh (jurisprudence) for minorities.  In the early 2000s, another 
option emerged:  commitment to a maqasidi-oriented and democratic-minded understanding of 
the “higher aims of the shariah”  (maqasid al-shariah).6   For those who favored the latter 
approach, Tariq Ramadan’s democratic reformist maqasidism was the most widely known and 
influential interpretation, and was still regularly referenced in my discussions with Muslim 
interlocutors in the 2010s.  Beginning in the late 1990s but accelerating in the 2000s, however, 
an ideologically heterogeneous Salafism also took root, especially among poor banlieu (suburban 
housing project) youth.7  Many of these youth had grown up in families that were at best casually 
observant; the youth’s encounter with Salafism, then, occurred not by way of family or 
neighborhood networks, but in small study circles (halqa) formed in the aftermath of meetings at 
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settings like mosques or mainline study groups, but then pursued in private and independent of 
mosque or community authorities.  As one Algerian-born imam in St. Denis observed in a 
conversation in October 2015:  
“This is a different kind of Salafism than the variety I had seen but not practiced as a 
youth in Algeria.  There the teacher (ustadz) had real authority, and his followers had to 
respect his leadership and guidance.  But here in France young people who have left my 
mosque to join Salafi movements don’t really listen to their seniors; they look around and 
find someone who says what they want to hear, or what they have learned on line, and 
stay with that teacher only as long as they agree with him. If they come to disagree, the 
young person just leaves to find a new teacher to his liking.”   
Although its genealogy is complex, part of the social momentum for the Salafiyyah ascent has to 
do young banlieu Muslims response to the rise of the National Front and hard right 
Islamophobia, about which I will say more in a moment. 
 In the face of these developments, and as confidence in old Marxist historical teleologies 
has waned, the French left’s representations of and advocacy for Muslims has splintered, in 
many respects even more fiercely than is the case in countries with a less “assertively secularist” 
tradition of religious governance like the United State.8  In France, one advocacy wing on the 
political left still represents the Muslim community in sub-altern, subordinated, and 
teleologically emancipatory terms.  However, the more widely cited social ontology today tends 
to be more ethically nuanced than it was in the 1970s and 1980s.  In particular, the multicultural 
left’s portrayal of the marginalization of French Muslims no longer represents this circumstance 
as product of capitalism and class inequalities alone.  Instead, Muslim marginalization is 
portrayed in terms of the French state’s exclusionary and assertively secularist model of 
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republican citizenship.  The latter is portrayed as granting admission to subaltern nationals, 
including Muslims, on the condition that they assimilate to a French republican identity and 
repudiate or background the religious content of their identity.   
 Because French republicanism is more assertively secularist than its counterpart in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada (with the notable exception of Quebec9) 
multiculturalism has always had a weak base of support in France.  For the other, non-
multicultural wing of today’s French left, efforts to defend Muslim aspirations for religious 
observance within a still-republican narrative is commonly seen as an ideological bridge too far.  
The issue in question is not merely that of a hegemonic French secularism.  Although not unique 
in this regard (Swedish social democracy shows parallels), French republicanism is unusual 
among Western civic traditions in the degree to which it proscribes intermediary identities and 
organizations between an idealized republican citizenship, on one hand, and the private lives of 
citizens, on the other.10  In high ideological principle, religion is tolerated only inasmuch as it 
does not move out from personal observance into the republican public sphere; it is especially 
unwelcome when it assumes an organizational form that hints of “communitarian” challenges to 
republican citizenship.  There is an interesting theoretical irony here.  Whereas in the early 1990s 
the Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam11 argued that civic or intermediary associations 
between family and state were one of the keys to “making democracy work,” the French formula 
for sustaining citizenship and democracy mandates the public bracketing of all such intermediary 
associations and their associated ethical imaginaries.   
 In part as a result of the crisis of pluralist citizenship the country is today experiencing, 
the French left is not just divided on how to represent and advocate for Muslims; its once 
hegemonic position with regards to citizenship debates has also foundered.  Conversely, the 
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country’s long marginalized Catholic community has enjoyed a small but notable public 
renaissance since the early 2000s.12  If the French Left is splintered on matters of advocating for 
Muslims, however, Catholics are all the more divided.   
 
CATHOLIC COLLABORATION AND TENSIONS 
 There is a small but outspoken wing of the French Catholic community dedicated to 
supporting struggles to secure recognition of and representation for French Muslims.13  Indeed, 
one of the unexpected findings of this research project was the discovery that the religiously 
ecumenical wing of the French Catholic community was confident that it had an alternative 
representation of French republicanism from that of the otherwise dominant secular 
republicanism, one whose lessons, its Catholic proponents felt, were directly applicable to their 
Muslim co-citizens.  At the heart of this Catholic counter-narrative on republicanism was the 
understanding that people of faith in France – most notably, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims -- 
could achieve a far more substantive degree of public recognition for their religious activities and 
institutions than a too formalistic understanding of secular republicanism might at first seem to 
allow.   
 So as to explain the counter-narrative that underlay this gently subversive Catholic 
understanding, it is important to recall a few background facts about Catholicism in France.  
Although just over one-half of all French citizens self-identify as Catholic, fewer than 5% attend 
mass weekly and only about 23% report that they are “engaged” to some significant degree in 
Church affairs.14  This is to say that, as with Christianity in Europe generally, there is a wide 
range of conviction and practice among those who identify in some measure as Catholic.15  Some 
limit their Catholicism to baptizing their children, marrying in a church, and attending funeral 
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masses.  But a larger proportion of these largely unaffiliated French Catholics fall into the 
shadowy social category that the UK sociologist Grace Davie has described as “belonging 
without believing.”16  In the case of many nominal French Catholics, the  “belonging” in 
question is stripped down to a bare minimum of identifying Catholicism as a cultural ingredient 
whose monuments and edifices should be maintained, since they bear witness to the wonders of a 
deep national heritage. 
 What struck me in the course of conversations with the minority of French Catholics who 
can be described as both engaged and religiously ecumenical is that many are convinced that, 
notwithstanding the precarious hold of Catholicism on the larger French public, there are 
nonetheless opportunities for public religion in contemporary France.  In particular, this minority 
among French Catholics sees the widespread perception of Catholicism as part of a national 
heritage as providing a measure of cultural capital for securing support for Catholic institutions 
that would otherwise be in peril because of the high cost of maintaining religious structures like 
churches, schools, and hospitals.  The facts say it all, and are perhaps surprising for Americans 
inclined to think that the high wall of legal separation seen in the U.S. is also found in France.  
More than 60% of French churches and schools today receive funding for their buildings and at 
least some among their staff.17  Secularist Republicans see this as support for confessionally 
neutral symbols of French national identity.  Interestingly, however, many of my ecumenical 
French Catholic colleagues understood this secularist concession in a different manner.  They 
regarded the crack in the high wall of French secularism not merely as a heritage-sustaining 
exception to the secularist rule, but as grounds for hope that an at least partial deployment and 
even restoration of Catholicism and, more generally, religion is still possible in public life.  
However, they insisted, to pursue this end requires that one avoid culture-war clashes like those 
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that so ravaged Catholic-republican relations in the early years of the twentieth century, when the 
French state was aggressively implementing a separation of state-sponsored schooling from a 
Church that had long jealously guarded its public educational role.18 The great majority of these 
“engaged and ecumenical” Catholics also say that they take exception to their more conservative 
and far-right Catholic counterparts, who have  used opposition to gay marriage and sex education 
in public schools as rallying cries for a more publicly assertive – and openly right-wing and 
Islamophobic -- Catholicism.  By contrast, the ecumenical Catholic strategy today refuses a 
radical privatization of religion, then, but does so while maintaining a double-consciousness with 
regard to laicite’s proscriptions and possibilities: endorsing an “open” (ouvert) interpretation of 
republican secularism, but interpreting it in a religiously-accommodating and multi-religious 
manner. 
 Here then is a curious variation on the theme of representation and advocacy with regard 
to Muslims in Western countries.  Many in the ecumenical wing of the Catholic community, seek 
to cue their Muslim interlocutors on how to represent their own tradition within the framework 
of French republicanism so as to secure that to which so many locally-based French Muslims 
aspire: land and operational funding for Islamic mosques and schools, as well as, ultimately, a 
greater measure of recognition and representation in French society.  The key, my ecumenical 
Catholic interlocutors said, was for Muslims not to mount direct cultural challenges to an 
assertively secularist republicanism,  but to endorse its principles while interpreting them in a 
less absolutist manner.  In concrete terms, the strategy might involve working to secure a plot of 
city land for an urban mosque or Muslim cemetery here, or quietly obtaining funding for teachers 
in Islamic schools – but doing this in a case-by-case manner, rather than through direct challenge 
to republican principles.  This piece-meal and gradualist strategy, the Catholics counseled, was 
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the only way to ensure a growing public recognition of Muslim citizens.  One Catholic colleague 
who lived in a small town fifty kilometers north of Paris explained this to me in the following 
way:   
“You have to be aware of your vulnerable position as a religious believer in a post-
Christian France.  So you play by the rules of the secularist republican game but in so 
doing you allow your community to survive and flourish.”   
As if an afterthought, she then added, “We Catholics who support Muslims worry that if Muslim 
leaders or young radicals challenge state secularism too directly, it will harm not only their 
prospects for accommodation, but ours as well.”19 
 
CHURCH OUTREACH AMIDST POPULIST BACKLASH 
 In the course of research, I encountered other, high-minded Catholic actors seeking to 
support even bolder strategies of representation and advocacy for French Muslims.  One of the 
most notable was a priest who directed (until 2016)  the Catholic Church’s official Service 
nationale pour les relations avec des musulmans.  Inspired by a series of inter-faith programs 
launched by Rome in the aftermath of Vatican II, the Service was established in 1973 with the 
aim of facilitating Church interactions with Muslims overseas, especially in the near Middle 
East.  But as the question of French Muslims surged on the national scene in the mid-1990s, the 
bureau shifted focus, dedicating most of its resources to public engagements with Muslims in 
France, with the aim, too, of challenging blatantly anti-Islamic representations.   To this latter 
end, the bureau sponsored public events in which the Service director, Father Christophe Roucou 
(active 2006-2016), engaged in well-publicized dialogue with prominent Muslim intellectuals 
and imams.20  Typically he and his interlocutor discussed some pietistic aspect of faith or public 
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comportment, speaking with a wit and mischievous irony intended to highlight commonalities 
across the two religions, not least with regard to their challenges in contemporary France, even 
while acknowledging theological differences.  Father Roucou is an Arabic speaker who had 
studied in Egypt in the 1980s, developing a sophisticated understanding of Islamic theology and 
law.  His strategy as director of the Service, then, was not one of promoting double-
consciousness circumvention but public-cultural familiarization:  reassuring an anxious Catholic 
public that Islam was not at all as culturally as alien as its secularist critics on left and right 
implied, but close both in history and ethical spirit to Western Christianity. 
 The two currents within the Catholic community with regard to advocacy for French 
Muslims that I have thus far highlighted are not the only viewpoints on Muslims within France’s 
observant Catholic community; nor, least of all, are they the most common.  In the course of 
research interviews I came to understand that many in the Church hierarchy and even more – by 
my informal estimate, a large majority -- among the observant laity took strong exception to the 
Service’s Islam-familiarization programs.  Many whom I encountered in fact pointed specifically 
and angrily at Father Roucou, insisting what French society needed was not a better  
understanding of Islam but crash courses for Muslim assimilation to republican values.  In 
personal interviews, Father Roucou acknowledged that he was frequently the target of public 
criticism and (in his own words) “hate mail.” 
 My visits to France since the early 2000s suggested that the tide of intra-Catholic 
opposition to Muslims has increased markedly over the past fifteen years.  Even priests in the 
communist-led but now heavily Muslim city of Saint Denis north of Paris made clear in 
interviews in 2015 and 2016 that most in their small congregations felt that the time for inter-
religious dialogue had (to their deep regret) passed, not least in the aftermath of the ISIS-inspired 
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Charlie Hebdo (January 7th) and November 13, 2015 attacks.  One priest in the historic St. Denis 
parish observed in October 2015 that his dialogical outreach to the local Muslim and nominally 
Catholic community had foundered since the mid-2000s; none among his parishioners seemed 
interested in attending any more.  In fact, he said, many of his parishioners today regarded even 
tenuous dialogue of this sort as evidence of the Church hierarchy’s estrangement from 
mainstream society and its deviationist flirtation with “multiculturalism.”   A casual man realistic 
about his ability to sway opinions in his working-class parish, this particular priest blamed the 
negative tide of opinion on two developments:  first, the recent growth of what he referred to as 
“Salafism” among Muslim youth in Paris’s northern suburbs, and, second, the shift in allegiances 
among many in this working class community from the Communist Party to the National Front.21  
 Tellingly, of everyone interviewed in Saint Denis and an adjacent suburb north of Paris, it 
was two imams from the same region who voiced sentiments closest in spirit to those of the St. 
Denis priest.  One of these mosque officials was a second-generation Moroccan-French and the 
other was a naturalized citizen born four decades ago in Algeria.  Both imams had a more 
nuanced sense than had the Catholic priest of the varied forms Salafism could take among 
French Muslim youth.  But both were, if anything, even more concerned about what they 
described as the growth of the “separationist” wing of the Salafi community.   In interviews, I 
asked each man what he regarded as the greatest challenge to French Muslims winning 
recognition and representation in mainstream society; my expectation had been that each would 
identify the far-right National Front party as the greatest threat.  But neither did.  Both cited 
Salafism.  One of the imams quickly qualified his statement, saying the problem was, not 
Salafism in general, but “wild” Salafism (Salafisme sauvage).  By this he meant a Salafism 
cultivated by youth independently in their own study circles, and looking more to the internet 
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than to local religious scholars for ethical guidance.  The imam regarded these new varieties of 
(to use his words again) “unschooled Salafism” as the greatest threat to the French Muslim 
community, he said, because they were sowing the seeds of distrust and division, leading many 
young people to turn away from imams and scholars associated with mainline mosques.  All this 
is giving rise, the imam added, to a form of social rebellion that “has more to do with growing up 
in France than it does with anything Islamic.”22 
 
POLITICIZING CATHOLIC TRADITIONALISM 
 Whatever the accuracy of the imams’ assessment, it is clear that the challenge faced by 
public advocacy in support of French Muslims has in fact to do with a host of developments, 
including developments internal to the observant Catholic community.  One of the more 
important of these developments has to do with the rise since the 1960s of a schismatic 
“traditionalist” Church formally opposed to most of the reforms initiated since the early 1960s in 
the aftermath of Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).  In its early years, the small traditionalist 
movement in France (as in other parts of Europe) focused primarily on theological matters 
unrelated to the Muslim presence in Europe.  The traditionalists prefer the 1917 Code of Canon 
law to the Vatican II reforms, and take strong exception to Vatican II’s promotion of inter-
religious ecumenism as opposed to an uncompromising Catholic supremacism.   
 In France, many of the Catholic traditionalists rallied around the dissident Catholic 
Archbishop, Marcel Francois Marie Joseoph Lefebvre (1905-1991).  A former missionary to 
West Africa, Lefebvre had initially played a role in the preparation of documents for the Second 
Vatican Council, but while attending the Council he emerged as one of the foremost 
spokespersons for the anti-reform wing.  After refusing to implement some Council reforms, in 
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1968 he resigned his advisory position  in an international Church mission, and, in 1970, 
established a small seminary in Switzerland dedicated to education in traditionalist Catholicism.  
In 1975, Vatican authorities instructed him to dissolve the society, which he refused to do.  In 
1988, and against the express wishes of Vatican officials, he consecrated four traditionalist 
bishops, an act which resulted in his excommunication from the Church.  Lefebvre insisted until 
his death three years later that his was not a “schism” because he still recognized the supreme 
authority of the Pope, even while disagreeing with decisions taken by current popes.23   
 Although at its origins traditionalist Catholicism was preoccupied with matters of 
Catholic theology and liturgy, from the mid-1980s onward Father Lefebvre began to link his 
movement to far-right political issues.  On numerous occasions he declared his support for the 
extreme right and Holocaust revisionist, Jean-Marie Le Pen.  Among the grounds for his support 
was Le Pen’s bitter opposition to Muslim immigration, which Lefebvre also publicly 
condemned.  Since Lefebvre’s death, the linkage of traditionalist Catholicism to anti-Muslim 
sentiment and conservative sniping against Church dialogue with Muslims has only 
strengthened.  
 Today in France, the Catholic traditionalists remain an only small percentage of the 
observant Catholic community – by some estimates only about 5% of the community as a 
whole.24  However, the traditionalists’ staunch opposition to gay marriage and sex education in 
schools has combined with their continuing fierce opposition to Muslim immigration and 
multiculturalism to allow them to serve as something of a vanguard for the conservative wing of 
the Catholic church as a whole.   Moreover, as the percentage of observant Catholics has 
declined dramatically since the 1960s, those who remain behind have simultaneously become 
less inclined to take their cues from the established Church hierarchy, and more inclined to rally 
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around certain red-line issues as abortion, gay marriage, and, no less significant, staunch 
opposition to Muslims and multiculturalism.25  Although far from a unified bloc, a significant 
percentage of observant Catholics have rallied  behind the National Front – and, along the way, 
have also made clear their distaste for the inter-faith advocacy promoted by ecumenical 
Catholics like Father Roucou.   
 
PUBLIC REASON AND THE CRISIS OF CITIZENSHIP 
 In a brilliant study some years back,26 the anthropologist John R. Bowen reminded 
anthropologists of the importance of exploring the public reasoning of Muslim teachers and 
intellectuals in France, and the ways in which they look to and reconstruct Islamic traditions for 
ethical guidance on living as Muslims in their European homelands.  The four country project of 
which this French study was part was premised on a similar aim, although we sought to extend 
our inquiry beyond the Muslim community to include Catholics and an amorphous default 
category our project called “secularists.”  As with Bowen, however, we were convinced that 
even in a post-Christian and post-modernist Europe some among the citizenry look to and 
transform received ethical traditions to grapple with contemporary problems of citizenship and 
public ethics.   
 All this said, the daunting complexity of Bowen’s thoughtful recommendation with 
regard to public reasoning has become increasingly apparent in contemporary France, as it has in 
much of the West.  One complicating variable is that so much of the sound and fury of public 
discussion today in cities like Paris and Marseilles, or on the twitter-scape here in the U.S.,  
emanates from populist actors little concerned with high-minded public reasoning, whether of a 
deliberative democratic sort, or in the sense used by Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad in their 
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discussions of religion as a “tradition.”27 The larger lesson here is that real-and-existing public 
spheres in late modern societies look much less like what Jurgen Habermas two generations ago 
described as an elite and largely male space for open-minded and deliberative discussion than 
they do culture-war battlefields. The rise of anti-Muslim populism across Western Europe and 
the United States over the past twenty years shows similarly that real-and-existing public spheres 
are at times characterized by a politics of posturing and deliberate media caricature – “fake 
news” – as they are any genteel concern for deliberative reasoning.  This makes the advocacy of 
people like Father Roucou or Tareq Oubrou with and for Muslim citizens all the more difficult. 
 A key feature of Marin Le Pen’s skillful leadership of the National Front involved her  
redirecting of the party’s public cultural invectives away from her father’s old-right anti-
semitism toward a more alt-right, contemporary, and redolently populist message: that Muslims 
were not and could not be part of the French nation.   This was a propaganda coup first and 
foremost, but, viewed more theoretically, it also exploited what has long been a critical 
vulnerability in understandings and practices of citizenship in Western democracies.   
 In his epic book on The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority 
Integration, Jonathan Laurence suggests that the way forward for Muslim integration into 
European society will be like that which secured Jewish integration in the earlier twentieth 
century: corporate pacts to secure formally equal citizen rights and representation in exchange 
for giving up at least some of the public perquisites of their Jewish identity.   The key to civic 
integration for European Muslims, Laurence claims, will be the same.  This is to say that it will 
be a matter of a deal-making between state officials and the corporate representatives of a 
disenfranchised but soon to be “emancipated” minority community.28   
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 Corporate pacts may well play some part in what is involved in securing Muslim 
recognition and representation in Europe’s future.  But what Laurence overlooks is that even for 
Jews generations earlier such pacts – with their representation of citizenship as a bundle of 
formal rights conveyed by the state to individuals and communities – were far from sufficient to 
neutralize the groundswell of anti-Semitism that flourished in mainstream “civil” society across 
Europe in the early to middle decades of the twentieth century.  As Bruno Karsenti has observed 
in his La Question Juive Des Modernes: Philosophie de l’emancipation,29 the Jewish question in 
most of early twentieth century Europe proved intractable not because of an absence of state-
leveraged pacts but because of the pervasiveness of anti-semitic resentments in society, as well 
as the readiness of radical right leaders to mobilize and exacerbate those sentiments for their own 
political ends.   
 Something similar is taking place in countries like France and, no doubt, the United 
States today.  It is less a matter of longstanding national laws or (even less) a uniform and 
powerful discourse like secularism that is the problem, than it is widespread prejudices and 
hostilities in society that are leading some long-resident citizens to ignore the advocacy appeals 
of actors like Father Roucou and look instead to political and media entrepreneurs promoting a 
more exclusive variety of citizenship. In these and other instances we are reminded that real-and-
existing citizenship for many ordinary moderns is not primarily a legal status conveyed by the 
state nor, even less, a bundle of rights owned by autonomous individuals by virtue of their 
membership in an imagined national community.  As Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, and others 
have emphasized, citizenship also depends on values and practices of recognition whose 
production and reproduction depends on, not just juridico-political instruments, but on more 
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societally sustained sensibilities as to one’s identity, community, and relationship with 
disregarded “others.” 30 
And herein lies the cultural cunning of the right-wing populist variety of identity politics 
that has flourished in France in the 2000s and, in a different manner, in the United States.  Right-
wing populists have shown a keen ability to exploit the gap between formal legal rights, such as 
those negotiated in corporatist pacts and enunciated in state legislation, and “ordinary” 
perceptions of citizenship conditional on shared life-ways, including those of dress, sociability, 
religion, and race. Headscarved teachers in some lander in Germany, minarets in Switzerland, 
hijabs, niqabs, and any variety of “ostensible” religiosity in public institutions in France – the 
populist right has represented all these as a multicultural bridge too far.   The populist argument 
has been made all the easier, of course, for reasons apparent in the discussion above:  namely, 
that real-and-existing public spheres in most Western democracies and most modern societies are 
not polite spheres of public reasoning, but arenas of contest, caricature, and fake news.   
 Recognizing the limitations of his 1994 model for “making democracy work,” the 
Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam has argued that one key to making democracy work in 
complex societies lies in nurturing “bridging” as well as “bonding” civic associations.31  The 
recipe sounds sociologically appealing, and it resonates with the proposals made by scholars in 
the field of peace studies who say that the key to making plurality work is for people from 
diverse ethnic, religious, and social backgrounds to put aside their intellectual reservations  and 
join with people of diverse backgrounds in local campaigns of community organizing and 
betterment.   My research confirms that interfaith collaborations like those of Father Roucou are 
helpful, and may well be transformative of some individuals.  But a nagging question remains:  
What is to be done with the overwhelming majority people who have neither the time nor the 
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inclination to engage in such collaborative dialogues? And what is to be done when a significant 
and determined portion of the Western public finds itself drawn to right-wing populisms that, not 
merely reject proposals for Muslim or other social groupings civic representations, but refuse 
even elementary forms of social recognition? 
 The broader point here is that in an age of twitter wars and neoliberal precariousness, we 
should not be surprised to see that certain entrepreneurs show a genius for exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of real and existing public spheres, as well as the gap between citizenship as a 
formal-legal reality and citizenship as imagined and lived by ordinary people.  The challenge is 
somehow to bring the equality and legal-mindedness of the former into deeper dialogue with 
ordinary life, so that slowly but surely, and as Father Roucou enjoined, some among the 
unfamiliar will be recognized as actually one’s fellows.   
It is here too that anthropological advocacy has a role to play, however weak and 
precarious it too may appear in an age of raging populist ire. Modern societies are made up of 
diverse social fields, and history shows that pluralist progress in one field can be easily reversed 
by uncivil bigotry in another.  The challenge for the anthropological proponents of pluralist 
civility, then, is to devise ways to slowly extend inclusive representations and advocacy from our 
restricted academic circles outward into society.  Along the way there will be obstacles and set 
backs, as well as whirlpools and eddies of indifference or, worse yet, anti-pluralist froth.  But 
that too is the new citizen reality in populist times:  there is and never will be any blissfully 
multicultural end to history, nor a public sphere of always earnest deliberative dialogue.  But to 
recognize these facts is not to succumb to pessimism but to find a practical path toward hope.  
Building better representations of and advocacy for Muslims and other targets of populist 
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exclusion is not an easy task in an age of twitter rage, but it is a pathway forward.  And it is one 
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